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The budget of the European Union nearly always raises much commotion. Many member states 
anxiously guard their net payment positions: don’t they pay too much for the EU compared to 
what they receive from the EU? Yet, from an economic perspective the subsidiarity principle is 
much more important: Should the funds be allocated by the Union or by the individual member 
states? From that angle, a number of fundamental reforms of European agricultural policy and 
structural actions (support to lagging regions) suggest themselves. These reform options may 
more than halve the EU budget. In addition they happen to bring the net payment positions of 
member states closer together.  
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Summary 
European citizens benefit from European integration at relatively moderate cost. Studies show 
that the average resident in the EU earns 10% more than he or she would have done without 
European integration. In addition, policy coordination in the EU prevents waste through 
overlapping policy efforts or discordant interactions between governments, such as a race to the 
bottom. The budget of the EU comprises about 1% of gross national income (GNI) of the 
member states. Costs of implementation of EU policies mainly consist of expenditure for the 
common agricultural policy and the structural actions (support to lagging regions). The costs of 
the European institutions, such as the European Commission and the European Parliament, only 
comprise 0.05% of member states’ GNI, i.e. 5% of the EU budget.  
Still, EU expenditure can further be reduced, if the subsidiarity principle is followed more 
strictly. According to this principle, EU policies are only warranted if they bring about 
additional gains over policies implemented at the national or regional level. Currently the main 
part of the EU budget is spent on agriculture and structural actions. Historically this can easily 
be understood. However, conditions have changed and, by consequence, a fundamental reform 
of the budget rules seems appropriate. 
For the EU’s agricultural policy, the criterion of common European interest is much less 
relevant than in the past. Hence, direct funding by the member states instead of the Union 
(financial renationalisation) of a substantial part of the outlays on agriculture seems reasonable. 
Over the past twenty years, the EU agricultural policy has changed considerably. The emphasis 
has increasingly shifted from guaranteeing minimum prices to providing support decoupled 
from production. In the long term, these direct payments can only be justified if the recipients 
produce socially valuable non-market goods or services. The decoupled payments, which at the 
moment are linked mainly to farm size and historical production, should be a direct reward for 
an explicitly delivered “service”, such as maintaining the landscape or the preservation of 
quality-of-life in rural areas. Because the benefits of these services primarily accrue to national 
or regional residents, there is much less role for the EU. 
When structural actions benefit only the poor member states and no longer the rich member 
states, effective redistribution in the EU is improved. Currently, also regions in rich member 
states benefit from EU structural actions. However, rich member states have sufficient means to 
support their lagging regions. Moreover, it is likely that national governments have better 
information on where and how to spend support effectively than the EU. They also have a 
stronger incentive to spend the means effectively. Hence, structural support can better be put at 
the disposal of the governments of the poor member states, which subsequently decide on the 
projects they want to spend it on.  
A rough calculation shows that implementing these reforms would more than halve the 
current budget. At the same time there would be no reason anymore to hold on to the budget 
rebate that all member states pay to the UK. By consequence, the net payment positions of 
member states would happen to be closer together as well. | 1 
1 Introduction
∗ 
The seven-yearly budget rounds in the European Union are always turbulent affairs. The 
decision making process on the Financial Perspectives 2007-2013, the multi-year budget which 
sets the ceilings for EU expenditure, was no exception. Only after difficult negotiations by the 
Heads of Government, an agreement could be reached. At first, the European Commission 
wanted to raise the expenditure ceiling, a move which was firmly opposed by a number of 
member states. The British were under pressure to give up their budget rebate, the French 
refused to discuss any reduction in common agricultural policy (CAP) spending, and the Dutch 
were unhappy about their large net contribution to the budget. The final compromise has all the 
characteristics of a compromise, as it lies roughly half way between the Luxembourg 
Presidency  paper of  June 2005 and the initial UK paper of  December 5.  
Because of all the sabre rattling, the debate on Europe sometimes seems to be restricted to a 
very narrow financial perspective. In general two obstacles make it hard to reach an agreement: 
member states’ emphasis on their net payment positions and the (overly?) critical attitude 
towards Europe by the general public in a number of member states. A focus on the net 
payment position creates a difficult coordination problem as stated by Gros and Micossi (2005):  
“.. no voice will defend overall EU interest. For any individual member country the 
return from defending an EU-wide encompassing interest is negligible compared to the 
advantage it can obtain from a change in the budget that might lead to a lower overall 
efficiency, but to more money for its own citizens or regional governments.”  
Stepping back from thinking in terms of net payment positions, demands a view on the 
budget as ‘a tool for fostering common goals’ (Gros and Micossi, 2005).
1  
The critical attitude towards Europe manifested itself most clearly in the no-vote in the 
referenda on the constitution in France and the Netherlands. To some degree, this may have 
been influenced by a biased view of the benefits and costs of the European Union. In some of 
the discussions the EU features as a money wasting institution that restricts the freedom of 
movement of national policy.  
However, the budgetary costs of the European Union are relatively small compared to its 
benefits. The EU budget accounts for only 1% of the combined gross national income (GNI)
2 of 
the member states. Within the EU, nearly all public expenditure is effected through national 
 
∗ Several colleagues commented on various drafts of the text. In addition, we would like to express our gratitude to Arjan 
Lejour for his contribution on the trade benefits of EU integration, to Frits Bos for his analysis of the budget data, to Jorge 
Nunez for providing insights in the EU budget, to Fred Kuypers and Nico van Leeuwen for retrieving input-output data, to 
Twan Verschaeren for updating the data from 2003 to 2004 and to Ton Brouwer for doing an excellent job in creating the 
figures, in particular the technically difficult figure 4.1. 
1 For some other publications which reject the juste retour approach, see Bos and Van Riel (2004) , and Cacheux (2005). 
2 European budget figures are usually expressed as a percentage of gross national income (GNI). The member states’ 
payments to the EU are partly calculated as a percentage of GNI (see section 4.1) and the budget ceilings are also 
expressed as a percentage of EU GNI (for instance, the ceiling for the current budget is 1.24%). GNI is equal to gross 
domestic product (GDP) plus the balance of primary income from abroad. 2 | 
budgets, and many European regulations have no visible impact on the EU budget.
3 Moreover, 
the benefits of European integration cannot be found on the budget. Benefits are not reflected in 
the net receipts that a member state obtains from Brussels; much more important is the 
additional trade that follows from the creation of a European internal market and the higher 
incomes for EU citizens this brings about. 
A stronger focus on subsidiarity may lower the two obstacles in the budget debate: the 
emphasis on net payment positions and the critical attitude towards the EU.
4 Subsidiarity 
implies that EU policies are only warranted if they bring about additional gains over policies 
implemented at a more decentralised level (member state or region within a member state). A 
substantial part of the outlays for the common agricultural policy and the structural actions of 
the EU are difficult to reconcile with the subsidiarity principle. This opens up options for 
reform, which would considerably reduce the size of the EU budget and bring net payment 
positions more in line with each other.
5 That may be a useful signal for EU citizens who worry 
about the growth of the EU and may focus the discussion between governments on the common 
good which European coordination can provide to its citizens.  
This paper reviews the EU budget from a subsidiarity perspective. Section 2 considers the 
economic benefits and the costs of European integration. Section 3 presents some options for 
fundamental reforms of the EU budget, in particular with respect to the two largest budget items 
agricultural policy and structural actions. Section 4 focuses on the consequences of the reform 
options for the net payment positions of the member states. Section 5 concludes. 
 
3 Pelkmans (2004) states that “The general conclusion for policy – which is nearly always lost in the debate on net payments 
– is that the economic and political significance of the European Union cannot be inferred from the EU budget”.  
4 This is in line with Gros and Micossi (2005) who argue for reforms of the budget starting from the principle that ‘expenditure 
at the EU level is appropriate only to safeguard a European public good.’ Yet, we consider the principle of subsidiarity to be 
somewhat more useful, because it can be made operational through economies of scale or external effects of a country’s 
policy on other countries. 
5 Other authors arguing for substantial cuts in EU budgets for agriculture and for structural actions directed at rich member 
states are: Sapir et al. (2004), Baldwin (2005), Peet (2005). | 3 
2  The benefits and costs of Europe 
The European Union offers its people a number of undeniable benefits. During the years after 
the Second World War, these benefits lay primarily in preventing the horrors of war and the 
disastrous economic consequences of the protectionism of the 1930s; but in the decades 
thereafter these benefits gradually shifted towards the welfare effects of economic integration. 
European integration has promoted trade within the EU. Between 1960 and 2000 intra-EU trade 
increased by 1200% in real terms, while trade between the EU member states and other 
countries increased by 730% over the same period (see Badinger and Breuss, 2004). The trade-
promoting effect of integration can be attributed in part to the abolition of customs duties 
between the European counties, the mutual recognition of product standards and the 
simplification of customs formalities. Regulations aimed at preventing implicit and explicit 
discrimination against foreign goods and opportunities to appeal against discrimination have 
also given a boost to intra-EU trade. 
What are the welfare effects of economic integration over the long term? Studies that 
directly analyse the effect of integration on economic growth have shown no permanent effect, 
but a level effect (and hence a temporary effect on economic growth) has often been identified 
(see Deardorff and Stern, 2004). Badinger (2005) estimates that income per head in the EU-15 
would be about 20% lower without economic integration. But because he makes no distinction 
between economic integration within the EU and integration with other countries within the 
framework of international trade agreements (under GATT and WTO), the intra-EU effect will 
be smaller than 20%. 
Another way of measuring the effects of integration on income is to make an explicit 
distinction between the effect of EU integration on trade and the effects of additional trade on 
income. Studies show that intra-EU trade is 30-60% higher than it would have been if the EU-
15 countries had not been EU members (Lejour and Nahuis, 2004). A 1% increase in trade 
translates into 0.2% increase in income on average.
6 Thus, if trade increases by 30-60%, 
incomes will increase by 6-12%. This final figure is broadly in line with Badinger’s findings. 
Although the economic literature offers no firm evidence on the income effects of European 
integration, it does not seem unwarranted to conclude that EU integration has raised incomes in 
the EU-15 by around 10%. 
Europeans benefit not only from economic integration through the internal market, but also 
from policy coordination by the EU. Under the subsidiarity principle, the EU has a role to play 
if policy is required on a European scale (e.g. competition policy for multinationals, space 
research) or if one country’s policies have a direct impact on another country (e.g. corporation 
tax rates, cross-border environmental issues).
7 In these cases coordination prevents waste 
 
6  See Lewer and van den Berg (2003). Their findings are based on a meta analysis of the empirical literature. Recent work 
by Frankel and Rose (2002) shows effects which are three times larger. 
7  See Mooij and Tang (2003), chapter 7. 4 | 
through overlapping policy efforts or discordant interactions between governments (a “race to 
the bottom”, for instance). The contribution of policy coordination to welfare is difficult to 
estimate, however. 
 
The benefits also entail costs. It costs money to operate the European institutions (European 
Commission, European Parliament, European Court of Justice) and to implement EU policies. 
Table 2.1 shows that agricultural policy and structural actions (consisting of the cohesion funds 
and the structural funds, which are aimed at stimulating lagging regions) account for most of 
EU expenditure. The costs of the European institutions are relatively modest (as is evident from 
the line ‘administration’ in Table 2.1), also in comparison with national governments. Thus, the 
number of EU civil servants, around 25,000, is broadly the same as the number of Dutch central 
government civil servants not involved in executive and administrative tasks (i.e. excluding the 
Tax Department, the judicial system and the Directorate-General for Public Works and Water 
Management). 
Table 2.1 also gives an indication of the implications of EU enlargement for the EU budget. 
As a percentage of GNI, total expenditure barely increased in the year of accession, 2004. 
Because expenditure on agriculture remained almost unchanged in nominal terms, it fell as a 
percentage of GNI, which compensated the increased expenditure on structural actions. 
Table 2.1  EU expenditure in 2003 and 2004 
         2003 EU-15          2004 EU-25 
Euro bn % EU GNI  Euro bn  % EU GNI  
Agriculture 44.4 0.47 44.6  0.43 
Structural actions  28.5 0.30 34.1  0.34 
Other internal policies (research, training, environment etc)  5.0 0.05 9.3  0.09 
External policies and other expenditure  8.3 0.09 8.3  0.08 
Administration 4.5 0.05 4.9  0.05 
Total EU expenditure  90.6 0.96 100.1  0.98 
Source: Table 3h in European Commission (2005).  
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3 Reform  options 
As for all public spending, the crucial economic criteria for evaluating EU expenditure are 
legitimacy (is there a role for government?), effectiveness (does the policy achieve its 
objective?) and efficiency (what does the policy cost?). Legitimacy and effectiveness are 
closely linked to subsidiarity: should the policy actually be implemented at EU level? These 
criteria certainly raise a number of qualifications and comments with regard to the two largest 
items in the EU budget, namely agriculture and structural actions. 
3.1 Agriculture 
EU agricultural policy has changed considerably over the past two decades. In response to 
escalating budget costs and international pressure, guarantee prices have been cut significantly. 
Consequently and because of production restrictions, export subsidies have also declined 
sharply. To ease the impact of these changes on farmers’ incomes, direct payments have been 
introduced. The policy shift is also reflected in the agricultural guarantees budget. In the early 
1990s almost the entire budget was spent on market-related measures, but these currently 
account for less than 25% of total spending; around 75% of expenditure is now in the form of 
direct payments.
8 
Over the longer term, the substantial direct payments can only be justified if the recipients 
produce socially valuable non-market goods or services. That is certainly the case in the eyes of 
many of those involved. They point in particular to the contribution which agriculture can make 
to the quality of life in the rural areas and to its role in preserving culturally and historically 
valuable landscapes. The direct payments, which at the moment are linked mainly to farm size 
and historical production, should be better targeted, however. They should be a direct reward 
for an explicitly delivered “green service” or a compensation for conditions which make 
farming impossible on a commercial basis but nevertheless socially desirable from a landscape, 
nature or quality-of-life perspective. In any case, the effect of a direct payment on the volume of 
agricultural production should be negligibly small. 
Furthermore, the subsidiarity principle raises the question whether it is best to implement 
agricultural policy, including the financing of public services, at EU level. Arguments abound 
for answering this question in the negative. Whether the costs of the non-market goods and 
services are worth the benefits can be determined better at national or regional level. Moreover, 
it is reasonable to ask those who benefit from the positive effects to bear the costs as well. Thus, 
 
8 The shift from market support to direct payments linked less to production and more to land (and farms) explains to a large 
extent the declining share of EU agricultural expenditure that ends up in the Netherlands. This share has fallen from 5.6% in 
1995 to 2.5-3% at the moment. The absolute figure for 2004 was 1.33 billion euro. Another explanation is the Dutch relative 
specialisation in products for which price support measures remained in place in the period under consideration, such as 
sugar and dairy products. The shift to direct payments primarily related to the EU cereals regime. The decline of the Dutch 
share in EU agricultural subsidies must be set against the benefit of lower import prices for cereals. 6 | 
if Finland wishes to develop a different form of agriculture in the cold north of Europe, or if the 
Netherlands prefers to promote small-scale dairy farming in its western peat districts, then the 
payment of income supplements from Brussels does not seem the most obvious way of 
achieving these goals. Community regulations run the risk of being inefficient and bureaucratic. 
They also invite “free riding” on the EU budget. The history of the common agricultural policy 
is littered with examples of this. 
Would financing at national level mark the end of the common agricultural policy? 
Certainly not. Competition on the single market calls for supervision of the ways in which the 
“multifunctionality” of agriculture (i.e. the combination of producing food and providing public 
services) is given shape. Member states must be prevented from supporting their own 
agricultural production under the guise of multifunctionality, thus creating unfair competition. 
Moreover, Brussels will continue to have a major role with regard to international trade 
negotiations. And given the importance of food as a basic commodity, the EU should be able to 
pursue community market and pricing policies in extreme situations, such as serious disruptions 
on the world market or following a succession of very poor harvests. 
3.2 Structural  actions 
European structural actions are less effective than they could be.
9 Structural actions aim to 
reduce differences in GDP per head of population among the EU’s regions. Billions of euros are 
spent on projects which improve infrastructure or modernise education, for instance. A number 
of studies have shown that these projects could significantly accelerate economic growth. 
However, analyses of actual growth in the recipient regions shows that only a small part of this 
potential is realised. Several of the poorest regions could expand by more than an additional 
0.5% per year if structural actions had the optimum impact. 
There are several reasons for the limited effectiveness of structural actions. Firstly, owing to 
the agreements made by the EU member states, a large slice of the support goes to relatively 
rich regions. Secondly, the criteria governing the distribution of resources do not always 
guarantee the selection of projects with the greatest social benefits. For instance, projects may 
not be sufficiently focused on stimulating economic growth in a region. And thirdly, national 
governments are prone to cutting their own regional support as soon as Brussels makes 
resources available. 
Reform of structural actions is desirable, given the large gap between potential and actual 
effectiveness. Structural actions can be reformed in three ways. The first option is to give more 
powers to the European Commission, in the form of tighter rules, more intensive monitoring 
and better project evaluations.
10 The downside of this is that the administrative expenditure 
associated with structural actions will rise appreciably. The second option is to distribute the 
 
9 The section on structural actions is based on Ederveen et al., 2002. 
10 The European Commission’s proposals for the new structural actions tend in this direction. | 7 
resources on the basis of competition among specific projects. In this case the European 
Council would set the total budget, but not the allocations across the member states. National or 
regional governments could submit project proposals. The Commission would assess these on 
the basis of a number of objective criteria. The downside of this is also a heavier administrative 
burden as well as the risk of lobbying behaviour to influence the Commission’s decisions. A 
third option is to run structural actions on national rather than regional lines. In this case the 
European Council would distribute the resources across the member states. On the basis of the 
redistribution principle underlying structural actions, only the poorest member states would be 
eligible; rich member states would be deemed to have sufficient resources to support their less 
developed regions. The poor member states would then decide themselves on which projects 
and regions they would spend the transfers from Brussels. This system of budgetary transfers 
would mean lower administrative costs and would be consistent with the subsidiarity principle, 
because spillovers between countries are small (see Brakman et al., 2005) and national or 
regional governments probably have more reliable information to allocate resources effectively. 
3.3 Budget 
What implications would the reform options outlined above have for the EU budget? To answer 
this question, Table 3.1 shows the appropriations for  commitments (i.e. maximum annual 
financial allocations) for the various budget lines according to the financial framework 2007-
2013 which was agreed upon by the Heads of Government in December 2005. The expenditures 
for competitiveness between 2006 and 2013 (line 1a) will increase by nearly 50%. These 
expenditures include outlays on research and development, which currently account for 0.04% 
of EU GNI. To an extent the increase fits in with a widely supported desire to invest more in 
knowledge in Europe.
11 The precise commitment to research and development is not clear, 
however, because this budget line also includes expenditure to improve the competitiveness of 
enterprises, trans-European networks, education and social policy, and the breakdown into the 
various components is not specified. Growth and employment receive greater attention in 
structural actions, which is why the Commission places all of its expenditure under the heading 
of sustainable growth. The scope for structural actions as a percentage of GNI is in the same 
order of magnitude as in the current budget (see Table 3.1). The market-related expenditure and 
direct payments under the common agricultural policy (line 2a) are slightly lower in nominal 
terms, which means that they are substantially lower as a percentage of GNI. 
 
11 See Bos and van Riel (2004). The Sapir Report proposes, in addition to reforms of agricultural policy and structural 
actions, the establishment of an EU fund for economic growth. This fund would finance projects in the areas of research, 
development and innovation, education and training, and infrastructure. The resources would be distributed on a competitive 
basis (in analogy with the second option for the reform of structural actions mentioned above) without taking account of the 
distribution across member states. See Sapir et al. (2004). 8 | 
Table 3.1  European Commission proposals for the financial framework 2007-2013, in 2004 prices 
    2006
a
 2007  2013   
  Euro bn % GNI Euro bn % GNI Euro bn  % GNI 
1. Sustainable growth  46.6 0.44 51.1 0.47 57.8  0.46 
1a. Competitiveness  8.8 0.08 8.3 0.08 12.6  0.10 
1b. Structural actions  37.8 0.36 42.8 0.39 45.2  0.36 
2. Sustainable management of natural resources  56.0 0.53 55.0 0.50 51.1  0.40 
2a. Agriculture
b
 43.7 0.41 43.1 0.39 40.6  0.32 
3. Citizenship, freedom, security and justice  2.3 0.02 1.1 0.01 1.9  0.02 
4. The EU as a global partner   8.5 0.08  6..3 0.06 8.1  0.06 
5. Administration
c
 4.4 0.04 7.1 0.07 7.7  0.06 
Total appropriations for commitments   118.0 1.11 120.6 1.10 126.6  1.00 
a 
To facilitate comparisons, expenditure for 2006 has been broken down according to the proposed new nomenclature. 
b 
Market-related expenditure and direct payments. 
c 
Including administrative expenditure for institutions other than the European Commission, pensions, European schools and 
compensations. Commission administrative expenditure is integrated into the first four expenditure headings. 
 
Source: Council of the European Union  (2005)
 
 
With the help of Table 3.1 it is possible to assess the budgetary implications of the reform 
options outlined in sections 3.1 and 3.2. Financial renationalisation of agricultural policy means 
that at least 80% of the outlays for nature management and agricultural policy are removed 
from the EU budget. The remaining budget covers the financing of the remaining policy 
commitments (e.g. market supervision, WTO, extreme situations). On the basis of the most 
modest budget (that of 2013), this boils down to a reduction in expenditure of broadly 0.35% of 
GNI. On the basis of the 2004 figures, the option to concentrate structural actions on the poor 
member states means that 16.6 billion euro will be released, or 0.16% of EU GNI, namely the 
amounts for the rich member states in 2004. For that year, nearly 17.5 billion euro is allocated 
to the poor member states (i.e. Spain, Greece, Portugal and the new member states). On 
balance, then, under these options the payments to the European Union are used mainly to 
finance the European institutions and the solidarity of the rich with the poor member states. | 9 
4  Net payment positions 
What are the implications of the reform options for the member states’ contributions to the EU 
budget? To answer this question this section first presents data on the net payment position of 
all member states and subsequently analyses the impact of the reform options on the net 
payment positions. 
4.1  Net payment positions in 2004 
Figure 4.1 gives an overview of the net payment positions of the EU-25 member states in 2004 
according to calculations by the European Commission.
12 The figure presents the contributions 
to the EU and the receipts from the EU for all member states, expressed as a percentage of GNI. 
The member states are ranked by GDP per head adjusted for purchasing power differences.  
Payments to the EU are made from four sources. The first is the customs duties which the 
member states collect at the EU’s external frontiers. The left (payments) part of Figure 4.1 
shows that customs duties are particularly relevant for Belgium and the Netherlands. The reason 
is that the harbours of Rotterdam and Antwerp act as gateways to Europe. The second source of 
payments is a percentage of VAT receipts, which as a percentage of GNI is distributed roughly 
uniformly over member states. The third source, which accounts for the largest share of the EU 
revenues, is a percentage of the member states’ gross national income (GNI). And the fourth is 
the rebate of 0.3% of GNI paid to the United Kingdom by the other member states. The cross-
shaded part on the left side of Figure 4.1 shows that all member states contribute to the UK 
rebate. However, from 1999 onwards the four countries with the largest net contribution to the 
EU (the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and Austria) have received a 75% discount on the 
rebate, which explains why their contribution is hardly visible in the figure. The cross-shaded 
part on the receipts side of the figure shows that all these contributions flow to the UK.  
The receipts by the member states mainly consist of amounts which the EU spends in the 
member state in question within the framework of agricultural policy, structural actions and 
other internal policies. As a percentage of their GNI, Greece, Ireland and Spain benefit most 
from the common agricultural policy (see the ‘Receipts’ in the middle of Figure 4.1), followed 
by Denmark, Portugal, Finland, France and Austria. The revenues of other countries (including 
the new member states) from the common agricultural policy are considerably smaller. The 
figure also shows that outlays on structural actions mainly flow to the ‘poor’ members of the 
former EU-15: Portugal, Greece, Spain and Ireland. In terms of their GNI the new member 
states can be seen to benefit substantially less than these four countries from the structural 
actions. Receipts by the rich member states appear limited as a percentage of their GNI, but 
because of the size of their economies they still account for nearly half the EU budget for 
 
12 Appendix 1 contains the data underlying Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2.  10 | 
Figure 4.1  Member states’ payments to the EU, receipts from the EU and net payment 
      positions in 2004, in % of GNI (with member states ranked according to GDP per 
      head adjusted for purchasing power differences) 
commission definition
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Source: see Appendix 1, table A1.1  
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structural actions (see section 3.3). Internal policies concern expenditure on education and 
training, energy, consumer protection, the internal market, R&D and trans-European networks, 
plus pre-accession outlays. The latter factor explains why this budget item is important for the 
new member states. Finally, Belgium and Luxembourg receive most of the amounts the EU 
spends on administration, simply because most of the EU institutions are established in these 
two countries. Figure 4.1 illustrates that this comprises a substantial part of their receipts from 
the EU, in particular for Luxembourg.  
The balance of all payments and receipts is the net payment position according to the 
accounting definition. The European Commission usually employs a different definition, which 
does not include transfers of customs duties and administrative receipts (for details, see the box 
and the footnote in table A1.1 in Appendix 1). Of course, the two definitions mostly differ for 
Luxembourg (administration), Belgium (administration and duties) and the Netherlands 
(duties).  
Figure 4.1 shows that under both definitions the Netherlands is the largest net contributor to 
the EU budget, followed by Germany and Sweden. The poor southern member states and the 
new member states benefit on balance from the EU budget. Ireland is a striking exception: the 
country receives relatively large amounts from the EU, even though it ranks second among the 
EU-25 member states in terms of GDP per head (adjusted for purchasing power differences). 
4.2  Impact of reform options on net payment positions 
Figure 4.2 gives a simple and rough financial analysis of the reform options. The financial 
renationalisation of agricultural policy eliminates virtually all payments to the member states, 
while 0.35% of GNI is deducted from the EU’s total agricultural expenditure (see section 3.3).
13 
Reform of structural actions is effected by only maintaining the expenditure for the poorest EU-
25 member states. For 2004, this means that 16.6 billion euro is no longer paid to the rich 
member states (out of total expenditure of 34.1 billion euro, see Table 4.1). Furthermore, on the 
payment side the British budget rebate has been abolished, since this was largely motivated by 
the small amounts received by the United Kingdom under the common agricultural policy. As a 
result of these reforms, the total EU budget shrinks considerably. The reduced commitments 
have been channelled back to the member states through a reduction in the GNI-based 
payments, so that the EU’s net budgetary position remains unchanged. 
 
13 This leaves 0.08% of GNI for market supervision, international trade and extreme situations, which are not allocated to the 
member states. 12 | 
Customs duties and the Netherlands’s net payment position 
Several definitions can be used to calculate the net payment positions of EU member states. According to the Dutch 
government, the Netherlands contributed 0.68% of GDP net to the EU in 2004; this is equivalent to 195 euro per head of 
population. But according to the European Commission, the amount in question came to 0.44% of GDP, or around 125 
euro per head. Even so, according to the Commission’s figures the Netherlands is also the largest net contributor to the 
EU budget (see Figure 4.1). 
In calculating the net payment position, the Dutch government includes all payments to the EU, including all customs 
duties
a, which after all flow into the Dutch state coffers in the first instance. This is known as the “accounting definition”. 
It is also used by the Commission, incidentally, when calculating the budgetary correction for new member states on 
accession. The accounting approach reflects a member state’s financial relationship to the EU budget. The European 
Commission usually employs another definition, under which the customs duties collected in the port of Rotterdam are 
not regarded as payments by the Netherlands but as belonging to the EU “by nature”, as it were. Based on this view, the 
customs duties are not included in calculating the net payment position. Accounting and legal arguments can be 
adduced in support of both definitions. From an economic perspective it is interesting to see who actually pays the 
customs duties. In other words, who will see a structural improvement in real income if the customs duties are 
reduced?
b 
 
A proportion of the customs duties collected in Rotterdam relates to transit goods destined for other countries, for 
instance Asian passenger cars and lorries transported to Germany via Rotterdam. The customs duties on these goods 
are therefore really paid by Germany or other EU countries. According to the Dutch national accounts, transit goods 
generate around 20% of customs duties. The remaining 80% of customs duties are paid by Dutch residents in the first 
instance, but these are eventually charged on to the final users, a substantial number of whom are based abroad. For 
instance, around 30-35% of customs duties relate to re-exports. In contrast with transit goods, ownership of re-export 
goods is transferred to Dutch residents, but these goods then leave the country with no or virtually no additional 
processing. Dutch re-export volumes are relatively large because the Netherlands is an attractive location for 
international distribution centres. Moreover, around 15-20% of the customs duties are levied on inter-company 
transactions and are thus eventually paid from export revenues. Taking all these factors into account, Dutch customers 
pay around 30% of all customs duties collected in this country.
c 
It should be noted in this context, however, that via the import of goods Dutch customers also pay a proportion of EU 
customs duties levied in other countries. This economic analysis thus leads to the conclusion that the impact of customs 
duties is determined ultimately by people’s consumption patterns rather than by the location where the duties are levied. 
 
a
 Adjusted for the compensation which the Netherlands receives for collecting the customs duties. Member states can withhold 25% of 
the collected amounts. A rough calculation shows that this is more than enough to cover all Dutch customs tasks. 
b
 In so far as the supply of the goods in question is not fully price-elastic (over time), the levying of customs duties leads in part to lower 
prices on the world market and in effect imposes a burden on producers outside the EU. This complication is not taken into consideration 
here. 
c
 See appendix 2 for an extensive analysis.  
 
The reform options for agricultural policy and structural actions lead to an improvement in the 
net payment position of the Netherlands. With regard to agricultural policy, the reason is that 
the Dutch contribution to the agricultural component of the EU budget exceeds the current 
disbursements to Dutch farmers from Brussels. The downside of the improvement in the net 
position is lower export revenues. A “full” financial renationalisation of agriculture means that, 
leaving extreme situations aside, every form of price guarantee has to be abandoned. For the | 13 
Dutch agriculture and food industries this means above all that the export prices of sugar and 
dairy products will fall sharply. As a major exporter of these products, the Netherlands will be 
heavily affected in relative terms. Under the new arrangements, European customers will only 
pay the much lower world market prices. Dutch farmers will then lose the advantage of 
receiving relatively high prices for these products (compared to the world market). Although the 
magnitude of such a loss is difficult to calculate accurately, it will certainly amount to several 
hundred million euros. This loss is not visible in the budget effect, nor is the countervailing 
positive effect on consumer welfare.  
When the reform options are implemented, the net payment positions of the rich member 
states are closer together under the European Commission definition than is the case at the 
moment (compare the two cases in Figure 4.2). Major net contributors such as the Netherlands, 
Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg will gain, while Ireland and Greece in particular will lose 
out considerably. This is because the rich member states’ net payment positions are no longer 
determined by their receipts from the EU, but by their lower payments to the EU. Because the 
payments are based on VAT receipts and GNI, the Commission’s benchmark for the net 
position (which is also expressed in GNI terms) is then logically more uniformly distributed 
across the member states. 
Of course, the reforms would mean that commitments related to the multifunctional 
character of some forms of agriculture, such as landscape conservation and preservation of a 
high quality of life in rural areas, as well as regional support, will have to be borne by the 
member states themselves. Against this, their gross payments to the EU will come down. What 
is more, decentralisation is likely to lead to efficiency gains. 14 | 
Figure 4.2  Net payment position of EU member states before and after financial renationalisation of 
agricultural policy, reform of structural actions and abolition of the UK rebate, in %GNI. 
realisation 2004
renationalisation agricultural policy, structural actions to poor member states, UK rebate
abolished
Net balances Commission definition
Latvia
Poland
Lithuania
Estonia
Slovakia
Hungary
Czech Republic
Malta
Portugal
Slovenia
Cyprus
Greece
Spain
Italy
Germany
France
Finland
Sweden
Belgium
Denmark
Austria
Netherlands
Ireland
Luxembourg
United Kingdom
-0,5 0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3
 
Source : see Appendix 1, table A1.2 
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5 Conclusion 
Subsidiarity implies a radical different perception of the EU budget compared to a focus on net 
payment positions. Guided by subsidiarity, member states agree to allocate resources to achieve 
European objectives (e.g. the common interest or redistribution from rich to poor member 
states). Resources applied for the common interest include, for instance, strengthening the 
internal market or the European knowledge economy. For these objectives, each member state 
will contribute according to its means. The benefit this generates is not visible in the funds 
flowing from the EU budget back to the member states, but in greater prosperity for the EU’s 
citizens and in solidarity with poorer member states. The distribution of that greater prosperity 
is not linked to the distribution of the receipts by member states from the EU budget. Outlays 
arising from solidarity with poor member states by definition benefit the latter, so that here too 
the net flow is not an issue for the rich member states. 
A stronger emphasis on subsidiarity leads to reform options that more than halve the EU 
budget. That may give a signal to EU citizens who are critical about the ‘scale’ of the European 
Union. It may also create options to redirect expenditure to other appropriations, such as the 
support of Europe’s knowledge economy, as advocated by, amongst others, Sapir et al. (2004) 
and Gros and Micossi (2005). Yet, also these options have to pass a subsidiarity test. For 
instance, it may seem reasonable from a subsidiarity perspective to finance research on an EU 
level, but it is less clear that the EU should be involved in support for small and medium sized 
enterprises.  
The conclusion is that reforms of the agricultural policy and structural actions are crucial for 
the improvement of the financial perspectives of the European Union. Much more than in the 
sabre rattling about the payments by and receipts for individual member states, this is where the 
opportunities lie for an effective and efficient funding of European policies. Then, EU citizens 
are likely to continue to benefit substantially from European cooperation. 16 | 
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Appendix 1 Net payments data 
Table A1.1  Gross and net payment positions per member state, 2004, in % of GNI (with member states 
ranked according to GDP per head, adjusted for purchasing power differences) 
 Luxem-
bourg 
Ireland The Net-
herlands
Austria Denmark United 
Kingdom
Belgium Sweden 
Payments to the EU  − 1.02   − 1.02  − 1.14  − 0.89  − 1,01  − 0.67  − 1.34   − 0.95  
Customs duties etc  − 0.06  − 0.10 − 0.30 − 0.08 − 0.13 − 0.13 − 0.44  − 0.11 
VAT-based payments  − 0.16   − 0.15  − 0.14  − 0.11  − 0.11  − 0.15  − 0.12   − 0.13  
GNI-based payments  − 0.72   − 0.68  − 0.69  − 0.70  − 0.68  − 0.69  − 0.69   − 0.70  
UK rebate
a
  − 0.09   − 0.09  − 0.01  − 0.01  − 0.08  0.30  − 0.09   − 0.01  
Receipts from the EU  4.78   2.30  0.46  0.71  0.83  0.41  1.71   0.51  
Agriculture  0.17   1.51  0.29  0.50  0.64  0.23  0.38   0.30  
Structural actions  0.13   0.69  0.08  0.14  0.10  0.13  0.12   0.15  
Internal policies  0.30   0.07  0.08  0.06  0.07  0.04  0.25   0.06  
Administrative expenditure  4.18  0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.96  0.01 
Net balance (acc. def.)  3.76  1.28 − 0.68 − 0.19 − 0.18 − 0.26 0.38  − 0.44 
Net balance (Com. def.)
b
  − 0.41   1.30  − 0.44  − 0.16  − 0.12  − 0.16  − 0.19   − 0.38  
      
      
 Finland  France Germany Italy Spain Greece Cyprus Slovenia 
Payments to the EU  − 0.96   − 0.98  − 0.93  − 1,03  − 1.06  − 1.06 − 0.79  − 0.66 
Customs duties etc  − 0.06  − 0.07 − 0.11 − 0.09 − 0.12 − 0.12 − 0.16  − 0.05 
VAT-based payments  − 0.14   − 0.14  − 0.12  − 0.15  − 0.15  − 0.15 − 0.10  − 0.10 
GNI-based payments  − 0.68   − 0.68  − 0.68  − 0.69  − 0.70  − 0.70 − 0.47  − 0.45 
UK rebate
a
  − 0.09   − 0.09  − 0.02  − 0.09  − 0.09  − 0.09 − 0.07  − 0.06 
Receipts from the EU  0.92   0.79  0.54  0.77  2.07  3.52 1.23  1.09 
Agriculture  0.58    0.58  0.28  0.38 0.80 1.68 0.06 0.19 
Structural actions  0.24   0.15  0.21  0.34  1.22  1.72 0.04  0.09 
Internal policies  0.08   0.05  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.10 1.09  0.78 
Administrative expenditure  0.02  0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.03  0.02 
Net balance (acc. def.)  − 0.05   − 0.19 − 0.39 − 0.26 1.01 2.46 0.43  0.43 
Net balance (Com. def.)
b
  − 0.05   − 0.19  − 0.33  −  0.22 1.08 2.52 0.53 0.43 
 | 19 
Continuation of table A1.1 
 Portu-
gal
Malta Czech 
Rep.
Hungary Slovakia Estonia Lithua-
nia
Poland Latvia EU-25 
Payments to the EU  − 1.01   − 0.75  − 0.69 − 0.70 − 0.66 − 0.69  − 0.69 − 0.68  − 0.62   0.93 
Customs duties etc  − 0.09 − 0.12  − 0.07 − 0.07 − 0.06 − 0.09 − 0.08 − 0.06  − 0.07   0.12 
VAT-based payments  − 0.14   − 0.10  − 0.10 − 0.10 − 0.09 − 0.10  − 0.09 − 0.10  − 0.08   0.14 
GNI-based payments  − 0.68   − 0.47  − 0.46 − 0.47 − 0.46 − 0.44  − 0.45 − 0.46  − 0.41   0.68 
UK rebate
a
  − 0.09   − 0.07  − 0.06 − 0.06 − 0.06 − 0.06  − 0.06 − 0.06  − 0.06  0.00 
Receipts from the EU  3.35   1.79  1.00 0.93 1.17 2.50  2.81 1.42  2.46  − 0.90 
Agriculture 0.63    0.06  0.11 0.08 0.12 0.19  0.29 0.16  0.30  − 0.43 
Structural actions  2.63   0.15  0.20 0.27 0.35 0.46  0.54 0.44  0.60  − 0.34 
Internal policies  0.07   1.49  0.67 0.57 0.67 1.76  1.93 0.81  1.50  − 0.09 
Admin. expenditure  0.01 0.09  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.01  0.06  − 0.05 
Net balance (acc. def.)  2.34 1.03  0.30 0.23 0.51 1.81 2.12 0.74  1.83   0.03 
Net balance (Com. def)
b
 2.37    1.02  0.33 0.25 0.51 1.79  2.13 0.75  1.82  0.00 
a 
The Berlin Council in 1999 agreed that the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and Austria would receive a 75% discount on the funding of 
the British budget rebate. Consequently these member states’ contributions are lower than those of the others. 
b 
Calculated as operational revenues (agriculture plus structural actions plus internal policies) minus the sum of VAT- and GNI-based 
payments (with an adjustment ensuring that the sum of all member states’ net payment positions comes to zero) minus the British budget 
rebate.  
Source: European Commission (2005). 
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Table A1.2  Gross and net payment positions per member state in case of financial renationalisation of 
agriculture, reform of structural actions and abolition of the UK budget rebate, 2004, in % of GNI 
 Luxem-
bourg 
Ireland The Net-
herlands
Austria Denmark United 
Kingdom
Belgium Sweden 
Payments to the EU  − 0.38   − 0.42  − 0.61  − 0.35  − 0.41  − 0.45  − 0.73   − 0.41  
Customs duties etc  − 0.06  − 0.10 − 0.30 − 0.08 − 0.13 − 0.13 − 0.44  − 0.11 
VAT-based payments  − 0.16   − 0.15  − 0.14  − 0.11  − 0.11  − 0.15  − 0.12   − 0.13  
GNI-based payments  − 0.16   − 0.16  − 0.16  − 0.16  − 0.16  − 0.16  − 0.16   − 0.16  
UK rebate  0.00   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00   0.00  
Receipts from the EU  4.48   0.11  0.09  0.07  0.10  0.05  1.22   0.07  
Agriculture  0.00   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00   0.00  
Structural actions  0.00   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00   0.00  
Internal policies  0.30   0.07  0.08  0.06  0.07  0.04  0.25   0.06  
Administrative expenditure  4.18  0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.96  0.01 
Net balance (acc. def.)  4.10  − 0.31 − 0.52 − 0.28 − 0.31 − 0.40 0.49  − 0.34 
Net balance (Com def)  − 0.07   − 0.28  − 0.27  − 0.25  − 0.24  − 0.32  − 0.07   − 0.28  
      
      
 Finland  France Germany Italy Spain Greece Cyprus Slovenia 
Payments to the EU  − 0.36   − 0.37  − 0.40  − 0.41  − 0.44  − 0.43 − 0.42  − 0.31 
Customs duties etc  − 0.06  − 0.07 − 0.11 − 0.09 − 0.12 − 0.12 − 0.16  − 0.05 
VAT-based payments  − 0.14   − 0.14  − 0.12  − 0.15  − 0.15  − 0.15 − 0.10  − 0.10 
GNI-based payments  − 0.16   − 0.16  − 0.16  − 0.16  − 0.16  − 0.16 − 0.16  − 0.16 
UK rebate  0.00   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 
Receipts from the EU  0.09   0.07  0.05  0.06  1.27  1.84 1.16  0.90 
Agriculture  0.00    0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Structural actions  0.00   0.00  0.00  0.00  1.22  1.72 0.04  0.09 
Internal policies  0.08   0.05  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.10 1.09  0.78 
Administrative expenditure  0.02  0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03  0.02 
Net balance (acc. def.)  − 0.27  − 0.30 − 0.35 − 0.35 0.83 1.40 0.74  0.59 
Net balance (Com def)  − 0.27   − 0.30  − 0.28  −  0.28 0.90 1.46 0.83 0.58 
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Continuation of table A1.2 
 Portu-
gal
Malta Czech 
Rep.
Hungary Slovakia Estonia Lithua-
nia
Poland Latvia EU-25 
Payments to the EU  − 0.40   − 0.38  − 0.34 − 0.34 − 0.31 − 0.35  − 0.34 − 0.32  − 0.32  0.42 
Customs duties etc  − 0.09 − 0.12  − 0.07 − 0.07 − 0.06 − 0.09 − 0.08 − 0.06  − 0.07  0.12 
VAT-based payments  − 0.14   − 0.10  − 0.10 − 0.10 − 0.09 − 0.10  − 0.09 − 0.10  − 0.08  0.14 
GNI-based payments  − 0.16   − 0.16  − 0.16 − 0.16 − 0.16 − 0.16  − 0.16 − 0.16  − 0.16  0.16 
UK rebate  0.00   0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Receipts from the EU  2.72   1.72  0.88 0.85 1.05 2.30  2.52 1.26  2.15  − 0.39 
Agriculture 0.00    0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  − 0.08 
Structural actions  2.63   0.15  0.20 0.27 0.35 0.46  0.54 0.44  0.60  − 0.17 
Internal policies  0.07   1.49  0.67 0.57 0.67 1.76  1.93 0.81  1.50  − 0.09 
Admin. expenditure  0.01 0.09  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.01  0.06  − 0.05 
Net balance (acc. def.)  2.32 1.34  0.55 0.52 0.74 1.96 2.18 0.94  1.84  0.03 
Net balance (Com. def.)  2.35   1.33  0.57 0.54 0.74 1.93  2.19 0.95  1.82  0.00 
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Appendix 2 Import duty incidence 
Introduction 
The purpose of this Appendix is to assess the extent to which import duties collected in the 
Netherlands are borne by customers abroad and to assess tariff incidence on final demand in the 
Netherlands vis-à-vis incidence elsewhere. The appendix shows that through trade the incidence 
of the duties is shifted to customers in other countries and that tariff incidence is more evenly 
spread over member states than tariff collection.  
International trade is in general more important for small member states than it is for larger 
ones. This is illustrated in table A2.1, which lists the member states that are also OECD-
members (EU-19) in decreasing order of their ratios of external goods imports with respect to 
GDP in 2001. In small member states, such as Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, trade is relatively important (total commodity imports 
as a percentage of GDP ranging from 68% in Belgium to 41% in the Netherlands). With the 
exception of land-locked Luxembourg, imports from non-member states are relatively 
important as well, its value ranging from 19% of GDP in Slovakia to 15% in Hungary. Hence, 
the value of import duties collected in these smaller EU-countries is likely to be relatively large 
as well.  
Table A2.1    External and internal goods trade of the member states of EU-19, as a percentage of GDP, 2004 
            Imports            Exports            Balance 
  External EU-19 External EU-19 External EU-19 
Slovakia  19 40 9 47 -10  7 
Belgium  18 49 17 56 -1  6 
Netherlands  17 23 10 36 -7 12 
Czech Republic  15 37 8 44 -7  6 
Hungary  15 35 10 35 -5  1 
Ireland  12 16 18 30 6 14 
Poland  10 20 6 19 -4  -1 
Finland  10 13 13 15 3  2 
Germany  9 13 10 17 1  5 
United Kingdom  8 10 6 8 -2  -2 
Austria  8 24 10 22 2  -2 
Greece  8 10 3 3 -5  -8 
Sweden  8 16 13 16 5  0 
Spain  7 13 4 11 -3  -3 
Italy  7 10 7 10 0  0 
Denmark  7 16 8 18 2  1 
France  7 11 6 11 -1  0 
Portugal  6 20 4 14 -3  -7 
Luxembourg  4 40 4 28 0  -12 
        
 EU-19 average  9 14 8 16 -1  1 
Source: OECD International Trade Statistics; OECD National Accounts; rearrangement CPB | 23 
To some extent, the table shows the importance of geographical location. A relatively large 
importer as Luxembourg, for example, hardly imports from outside EU-19. Belgium and the 
Netherlands with their huge seaports act as a gateway into the EU for external imports. They 
run a deficit in external trade (1% of GDP in Belgium, 7% in the Netherlands) and a surplus in 
internal trade (6% in Belgium, 12% of GDP in the Netherlands).  The deficits in external trade 
and surpluses in internal trade of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary presumably 
indicate the importance of these countries as a production location for serving the EU-market. 
Thus, for these countries one may expect that a considerable part of the burden of paying import 
duties is shifted to customers in other states.  
Our approach consists of a static input-output analysis. Using National Accounts data we 
assess the extent of shifting the incidence of import duties to foreign customers and tariff 
incidence on final demand by applying input-output techniques to the data these accounts 
provide. The analysis is a structural and static one and assumes that all variable trading and 
production costs (including tariffs on imports) are in the end borne by final customers. This is in 
agreement with micro-economic theory which tells us that firms will fully charge their 
customers for the variable costs they incur, irrespective of the nature of competitive 
circumstances. The techniques applied require assumptions of fixed proportions. Hence, the 
outcomes are of an indicative nature.  
What are the destinations of Dutch imports and Dutch import duties? 
In assessing the destinations of Dutch imports and Dutch import duties, we use the Dutch 
National Accounts for 2004 and the globally integrated national accounts for 2001 of the Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP).
14 Most Dutch imports find their destination abroad. It is 
important to note that the import data of the Dutch National Accounts do not include transit 
trade that simply passes through the Netherlands without any ownership transfer to Dutch 
inhabitants. The imports that are covered by the Dutch National Accounts may reach foreign 
customers through two channels: either through direct re-export or through indirect re-exports. 
In the case of direct re-exports, the imported goods or services are re-exported almost without 
any transformation, whereas in the case of indirect re-exports the imports are used as 
intermediates in Dutch production and the produced goods are then exported. 
In 2004, 36% of Dutch imports was directly re-exported while 25% indirectly got a foreign 
destination by being used up in the production of exported goods and services (see table A2.2). 
Hence, a major part (61%) of Dutch imports arrives at a destination abroad. Electro-technical 
and chemical products contribute in relatively large amounts through direct re-exports while 
indirect re-exports are relatively large for Commercial services and Other industries. 
About 20% of the import duties collected in the Netherlands is borne by transit trade. 
Assuming that the remaining duties would proportionally rest upon Dutch imports, we would 
conclude from table A2.2 that 69% of the import tariffs collected in the Netherlands in 2004 are 
 
14 We use the GTAP-6 database (Dimaranan and McDougall, 2005). 24 | 
Table A2.2  Foreign destinations of Dutch imports, as a percentage of total non-transit imports by industry, 
2004 
  Direct re-exports Indirect re-exports Total Idem,  as % of 
Grand Total 
Agriculture 39 29 68 3 
Food and beverages  29 24 52 5 
Chemical industry  46 32 79 15 
Metal products     34 37 70 6 
Machinery 36 19 55 3 
Electro-technical products  76 5 82 28 
Transportation vehicles  17 15 33 3 
Other manufacturing  32 13 45 7 
Commercial services  14 35 49 14 
Other industries  10 42 52 14 
Grand Total  36 25 61 100 
Source: National Accounts 2004, Statistics Netherlands; calculations CPB  
 
in the end paid by foreign buyers. This percentage is arrived at as the sum total of 20% on 
transit trade, 29% (=0.8*36%) on direct re-exports and 20% (=0.8*25%) on indirect re-exports. 
 
As the import duties on non-transit imports are directly available in the Dutch National 
Accounts this guesstimate can be improved. Using these data, we arrive at an aggregate figure 
that comes very close to it: about 70% of the incidence of import duties is shifted abroad, the 
share of duties on direct re-exports being somewhat higher than expected on the basis of import 
data only (see table A2.3). 
Table A2.3  Foreign destinations of Dutch import duties, as a percentage of total import duties by industry, 
2004 
  Transit export Direct re-export Indirect re-export Total 
   
Agriculture 9 35 27 71 
Food and beverages  26 21 18 64 
Chemical industry  16 39 27 82 
Metal products     42 20 21 83 
Machinery 12 31 17 60 
Electro-technical products  16 64 4 85 
Transportation vehicles  22 14 12 47 
Other manufacturing  16 27 11 54 
Commercial services  0 0 0 0 
Other industries  32 15 36 82 
Grand total  20 33 17 70 
Source: National Accounts 2004, Statistics Netherlands; calculations CPB  
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Again, the contribution of direct re-exports of electro-technical products is relatively large; the 
chemical industry is also contributing relatively much through both direct and indirect re-
exports while a considerable amount of duties is paid directly by foreigners on transit trade in 
food and beverages. 
 
Using the GTAP-6 database − and assuming that the duty exports are borne proportionally by 
the underlying bilateral export flows by industry − we can derive the geographical destinations 
of Dutch non-transit duty exports. Unsurprisingly, a major part (more than 40%) of Dutch non-
transit duties is paid by final consumers in the other member states, notably in Germany (12%), 
the United Kingdom and France (both 6%), see figure A2.1. A considerable part is also re-
exported to the rest of the world where final consumers pay more than 20% of Dutch tariffs on 
non-transit trade. A very small part (0.5%) re-enters the Netherlands embodied in final 
products. Assuming that the duties on Dutch transit exports are fully borne by final consumers 
in other EU-countries, final customers in other member states pay about 53% (=0.8*41 +20) of 
the total Dutch import duty bill, those in the rest of the world 17% and Dutch final buyers about 
30%. 
Figure A2.1  Percentage destinations of Dutch non-transit import duties, 2004 
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Source: GTAP-6 database, calculations CPB 
 
What is the incidence of import duties in the Netherlands? 
Input-output analysis of the Dutch accounts shows the tariff incidence on Dutch demand (see 
table A2.4). The table brings to the fore two aspects of tariff incidence. First, although tariffs on 
commercial services imports do not exist, demands for services are not tariff-free, because in 26 | 
the process of producing services tariffs on non-service inputs are incorporated. Second, Dutch 
exports − bearing tariffs −  obviously are a vehicle of shifting tariff incidence abroad. But by the 
same token Dutch import values themselves must contain tariffs, when they enter the 
Netherlands from other member states. Hence, the tariff incidences shown in the table 
underestimate the tariff contents of demand and an international analysis is needed to assess 
final Dutch tariff incidence.  
Table A2.4  Incidence of Dutch non-transit duties on domestic and foreign demands by industry, as a 
percentage of demands, the Netherlands, 2004 
            Final domestic demand         Export demand 
 Directly 
imported  
Domestically 
produced Total 
Direct re-
exports
Indirect re-
exports  Total 
Agriculture  1,5 0,1 0,7 1,5 0,1 0,5 
Food  and  beverages  1,2 0,3 0,6 1,2 0,3 0,5 
Chemical  industry  0,6 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,2 0,3 
Metal products     0,5  0,2 0,3 0,5 0,2  0,3 
Machinery  0,6 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,2 0,3 
Electro-technical  products  0,3 0,1 0,3 0,3 0,1 0,3 
Transportation  vehicles  0,4 0,2 0,4 0,4 0,2 0,2 
Other  manufacturing  0,9 0,2 0,5 0,9 0,2 0,5 
Commercial  services  0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 
Other  industries  0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 
      
Total  0,5 0,0 0,1 0,5 0,1 0,2 
Source: National Accounts 2004, Statistics Netherlands; calculations CPB 
  
 
The GTAP-6 international accounts are a suitable data source for this assessment. These 
accounts include tariffs on bilateral trade flows for 2001. The tariffs still contain bilateral 
import duties and agricultural levies on trade between the member states of EU-15 and the new 
members that joined the EU on May 1st, 2004. To reflect the current situation, we replace these 
tariffs by estimates for 2004 by industry and member state. These estimates are arrived at by 
applying Dutch tariff rates (i.e. Dutch 2004 import duties and agricultural levies expressed as 
ratios of Dutch 2004 external imports by industry) to the external imports by industry of each 
member state, scaling the tariffs afterwards to the sum total of 2004 tariff transfers to the 
European budget
15. 
It then appears that final tariff incidence in the Netherlands comes very close to the EU-
average  (see figure A2.2).  The figure shows relatively low incidence in Italy. This is caused by 
a relatively small share of imports in total demand. The figure also indicates a somewhat higher 
tariff incidence in the new member states (EU-10) compared to those of EU-15. The cause of 
this difference is the smaller relative size in the new member states of the services sector (which 
 
15 The scaling is to the sum total of transfers of traditional own resources to the EU-budget raised by 33% to reflect collection 
costs. In arriving at the sum total the transfers of the new member states have been raised by 50% to reflect the date of their 
accession (cf. Table 4a in European Commission, 2005). | 27 
indirectly bears some duties but still has tariff rates that are much smaller than those on 
manufacturing sectors). Tariff incidence in the rest of the world is somewhat higher than in the 
European Union. The cause of this is higher tariffication of both manufactured products and 
services.  
Figure A2.2  Tariff incidence as a percentage of final demand, 2004 
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Conclusions 
Our assessments are the result of static input-output analysis of National Accounts data
16.  
Using the Dutch National Accounts of 2004 to assess the extent of shifting the Dutch tariff 
burden abroad, we conclude that about 70% of the tariffs collected in the Netherlands are paid 
by foreign customers. Using detailed National Accounts data of the Global Trade Analysis 
Project (GTAP) for 2001 we assess the destinations of these tariffs. It turns out that other EU-
countries pay the major part of the Dutch tariff bill. The bill passed on to customers in non-EU 
countries is also considerable.  
While the Dutch export most of the import duties levied in the Netherlands, they also import 
duties levied elsewhere in the EU. Assessing total tariff incidence globally we conclude that 
Dutch tariff incidence is in line with the incidence in the other member states of the European 
Union.  
 
16 The computational details of these can be found in http://www.cpb.nl/eng/pub/memorandum/128. 
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